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A trend of increasing role of central bank's independence took place in the most of modern economies. The 
central bank independence (CBI) is seen as a way of bringing economy to a higher level.  It is argued that an 
independent central bank is more credible and moreover, that the higher degree of central bank independence 
facilitates central bank to identify signals of financial problems and alert financial markets. Furthermore, an 
independent central bank is less likely to be exposed to the inflationary bias, inherent in monetary policy, and is 
more aware of the inflation costs of expansionary monetary policy. This is in line with Friedman’s theoretical 
concept that the phenomenon of inflation is to be regulated by controlling the amount of money poured into the 
national economy by the central bank. In order to achieve the main goal; price stability, it is essential for a 
central bank to be connected to government as little as possible. However, governments generally have a 
certain influence over central banks, even in the case of banks who claim to be independent. The first part of 
the paper offers theoretical background for the central bank independence (CBI concept). The empirical 
evidence on the relationship between central bank independence and economic variables suggests negative 
relationship between central bank independence and inflation. The strong evidence of central bank 
independence influence on other macroeconomic variables so far has not been found. The analysis of the 
independence of Croatian national bank was made using 3 different methods; 1) central bank governor turnover 
rate (TOR), 2) Petursson G. Thorarinn criterion and 3) Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (CWN) questionnaire. 
The obtained results affirm high level of central bank independence in Croatia. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper consists of five sections. After introduction, second part deals with theoretical assumptions of 
the independence of central banks; third section comprises empirical research of the CBI, while the fourth 
section concentrates on situation of independence of Croatian National Bank (CNB). In the fifth part we 
provide conclusion and the main findings of the paper. The aim of this paper is to define independence of 
central banks and to examine its relation to other macroeconomic variables and measurements that are used 
in that process. Furthermore, the paper will analyze and evaluate independence of the CNB. 
 
A trend of increasing role of CBI took place in the most of modern economies. The CBI is seen as a way of 
bringing economy to a higher level.  It is argued that an independent central bank is more credible and 
moreover, that the higher degree of independence facilitates central bank to identify signals of financial 
problems and alert financial markets. Furthermore, an independent central bank is less likely to be exposed 
to the inflationary bias, inherent in monetary policy, and is more aware of the inflation costs of 
expansionary monetary policy. This is in line with Friedman’s theoretical concept that the phenomenon of 
inflation is to be regulated by controlling the amount of money poured into the national economy by the 
central bank. He also concluded that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.
1 In order 
to achieve the main goal; price stability, it is essential for a central bank to be connected to government as 
little as possible. However, governments generally have a certain influence over central banks, even in the 
case of banks who claim to be independent. Independence of central banks was also initiated through out 
certain regional factors that contributed to the increase; the breakdown of systems which were earlier a 
support to stability
2, additionally emphasized need for alternative; good results of the German Bundesbank 
which had a high degree of independence; increase of the central banks’ independence as a prerequisite for 
joining the EMU; attempts of the governments looking for institutional solutions in order to maintain stable 
economic conditions. Moreover, high CBI came as a logical solution; the former socialistic countries, 
tentative to implement free market rules, most often copied the best western practices. Similar trend also 
happened in central banking (Cukierman, 2006). 
 
 
2.  Central bank independence 
 
2.1. Definition of central bank independence  
 
Though at first it seems as an unambiguous and clearly defined concept, CBI has been variously defined by 
different authors. When defining the concept, most of the authors end up describing their own 
understanding of it. The earliest “definition” of CBI was offered by David Ricardo in his “Plan for the 
Establishment of a National Bank”
3 (1824) where he said: “It is believed that the state cannot be entrusted 
with issuing paper money because it will most probably be abused. I admit it would be very dangerous if 
ministers were authorised to issue paper money. That is why I suggest that these authorities are given to 
commission members which will be chosen by the votes of one or both Houses of Parliament. Also, I 
suggest that any kind of communication between members of the commission and the ministers should be 
hindered. Commission should never, whatever the reasons are, lend money to the state or in any way be 
influenced or controlled by it. If the state needs money, it is obliged to collect it in a legitimate way: by 
taxes, issuing exchequer bills or lending from any other bank. In no case should the state be allowed to lend 
money from those who issue it” (Fraser, 1994). 
 
Later definitions are only different interpretations of Ricardo’s idea. According to Friedman (1962), the 
autonomy of the central bank implies a central bank–state relationship similar to one which state has with 
judiciary. The judiciary works in certain legal frameworks and a prerequisite for any kind of deviation is 
changing legal framework (Eijffinger, Haan, 1996). Walsh (2005) claimed that CBI can be found in 
                                                                          
1 Milton Friedman, Anna Jacobson Schwartz  (1963), A Monetary History of the United States , p.104 
2 Bretton Woods system and European monetary system 
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excluding monetary policy officials from any kind of political or state influence when implementing 
monetary policy. 
 
Ambiguity and different definitions of independence, as well as the complexity of relations between the 
central bank and the state, had impact on differentiation of various aspects of independence. In general, it 
can be divided onto two factors; independence of objectives and independence of instruments. 
Independence in choosing objectives refers to the possibility of central bank to determine, without the 
involvement of the government, the objectives of its activities. Instrumental independence, on the other 
hand, demands complete freedom while choosing instruments used to achieve the objectives. This division 
was accepted by most of the authors in papers written during the 1990s (see Fraser (1994), Briault et al. 
(1996), Amtenbrink et al. (1998). 
 
Cukierman (1992) divided the criteria for CBI into four groups. The first component refers to the 
appointment and dismissal of the governor and other bank members. The second characteristic concentrates 
on the ability of central bank to independently define the objectives of the monetary policy and to its ability 
to have a final authority in decision making process. The third component investigates the extent to which 
central bank defines price stability as its main objective. At last, the fourth component measures the level of 
restrictions that are imposed on the central bank lending.  Furthermore, Cukierman also examines the TOR 
of central bank governors and he perceives it as a measure of “real” CBI. Siklos (1994) uses this index as 
the basis for developing his own index of CBI for transition countries. Grilli et al. (1991) (GMT) define two 
groups of criteria for CBI; political and economic independence. In the latter index, the goal set for the 
central bank is one of the criteria. The index defined by Loungani and Sheets (1995) builds on the work of 
GMT. 
 
Moreover, Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Fischer (1995) also make the distinction between goal (political) 
and instrument (economic) independence. They also point out that CBI appears to be primarily associated 
with instrument independence while goal independence comes to second place. There is less chance that 
central bank would act opportunistically and the problem of time inconsistency would happen if the 
government does not implement monetary policy independently. Exceptions are central banks with more, 
most often inadequately determined objectives. The absence of explicitly formulated objectives leaves the 
central bank a very wide manoeuvring space where it is completely independent in setting the final 
objective and can determine its priorities, depending on the situation. An example of a bank with both 
instrumental and goal independence is the American FED. Although legally determined, objectives of FED 
are vaguely defined (maximum employment) which provides full independence in conducting the monetary 
policy (Walsh, 2005). 
 
Evolution of understanding the significance of an independent central bank resulted in a more complex 
comprehension which included new segments of central bank’s activities. Apart from independence in 
creating policy; independence in choosing objectives and instrumental independence, Eijffinger and Haan 
(1996) differ two more levels of independence: personal and financial.  Individual independence refers to 
the involvement of state into employment of central bank’s employees. The authors believe that it is not 
completely possible to eliminate the state’s influence in this context. According to them, the solution could 
be the presence of state officials in the boards which employ people. Financial independence implies 
absence of any kind of credit relation between the central bank and the state. The role of CBI in 
implementing consistent monetary policy became more important with time. This is primarily conditioned 
by the results of empirical research which, in most cases, confirm negative connection between the level of 
independence and inflation rate. The final and the most complex elaboration of the “independence” 
phenomenon were done by Scheller (2006) in ECB
4’s monograph “The European Central Bank – History, 
role and functions”. Considering the factors which might influence results of the central bank’s monetary 
policy, the ECB’s experts singled out five types of independence as prerequisites for optimum 
implementation of the monetary policy; institutional independence, legal independence, personal 
independence, functional and operational independence, and, finally, organisational and financial 
independence. The mentioned forms have legal basis in the EC Treaty and later agreements.  
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2.2. The increasing role of CBI 
 
The problem of independence, its measurement and influence it has on macroeconomic variables over the 
last twenty years have been interesting topics for the scientific community. During the 1970s and in the first 
half of 1980s most of developed countries were going through continuous inflation periods. The public 
wanted to know why. An acceptable explanation came from Barro and Gordon (1983) who found reasons 
for high inflation rate in the measures of monetary policy. Their thesis was that high inflation rates are 
results of the objectives set too high i.e. that the objectives set by central banks; GDP growth and 
unemployment fall, were variables set above their natural values at which inner and external balance 
happened. Under the influence of rational expectations, the public’s response was in accordance with 
expansive monetary policy. Finally, the results of overheated economy were inadequately high inflation 
rates with an insufficient growth of real income. The cause of such high inflation asked for new 
explanations, especially about the motives of central bank to, under certain circumstances, subject the price 
stability to economic growth and unrealistic macroeconomic objectives. The reasons for inconsistent 
monetary policy turned out to be of uneconomic nature and it seemed that the behaviour of central banks 
was motivated by political influence. The governing party, in need of votes, is dominantly orientated to 
short-term positive economic effects. Expansive monetary policy is a unique solution, but it ignores short-
term inflation effects of monetary expansion. Because of everything above mentioned, the prerequisite to 
solution of the problem has to be an increase in CBI. 
 
Although the tendency for increasing CBI was connected exclusively to decrease of inflation rate, number 
of reasons grew with time. Cukierman (2006) thinks the trend of increased independence is conditioned by: 
a) global and b) regional factors. He considers two global factors; the tendency to decrease inflation and the 
factor of globalization. Namely, liberalization in all segments of economy, especially capital flow and 
expanding capital market, increased the need for stable macroeconomic conditions. High degree of CBI and 
its focus on preserving price stability additionally instil trust to domestic and foreign investors. Apart from 
this, Cukierman finds the opinion of the IMF as a certain encouragement. The IMF
5 supported high 
independence of central banks and even made it a condition in the reforms it took part in. 
 
 
3.  The empirical research of CBI 
 
The development of the idea of CBI had the strong influence on a number of scientists and their researches, 
connected to this field. At the end of 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s, a great number of researches 
investigated relationship between the CBI and chosen macroeconomic variables. The main subject of 
research was primarily the influence of independence level on inflation, or the inflation variability. The 
research also dealt with other macroeconomic variables and investigated the influence of the independence 
level on: the GDP growth, variability of the GDP growth rate, disinflation costs, interest rates, etc.   
 
In the review done on the influence of CBI on certain macroeconomic variables, Eijffinger and Haan 
(1996) listed 26 researches, done in the period 1988 –1996. The pioneers in this field were Bade and Parkin 
who studied the influence of independence on inflation and its change back in 1988. On the example of 
twelve industrial countries their research confirmed the inverse relation of independence and inflation, 
while the causal connection between the level of independence and inflation variability was not proved. 
Alesina (1998) and De Haan and Siermann (1995) obtained similar results on the examples of 16, i.e. 43 
countries. In contrast to this, Cargill (1995), de Haan (1995) and Eijffiger and Van Kuelen (1995) did not 
find any evidence on statistically significant influence of independence on inflation and its variability. The 
importance of the research done by Eijffiger and Van Kuelen also lies in the fact that they used four 
indexes (AL, BP, ES, and GMT) to determine the independence. Posen (1993, 1995) used data for 17 
countries to regress the 1950-1989 average annual level of inflation on CBI, financial sector opposition to 
inflation (FOI) and other control variables. His results showed that there is a significant negative correlation 
between FOI and inflation. On the other hand, he concluded that LVAU
6 does not have a negative 
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correlation with inflation. Furthermore, he regressed the influence of LVAU on FOI and concluded a 
positive influence of FOI on LVAU.  In his second work, based on data of 32 countries, he reached the 
same findings. Fuhrer (1997) used the data for a set of 70 countries and regressed a measure of inflation 
LVAW
7 and other macroeconomic variables. His results did not show any significant correlation between 
the inflation and LVAW. Campillo and Mirno (1997) follow an opinion rather similar to Fuhrer's. They 
claim that CBI is a relatively unimportant determinant of inflation performance, using the CUK indicator as 
measure of CBI. In the extended model of Campillo and Miron, some additional variables are included; 
average inflation in the previous period, political instability, the degree of openness, GDP per capita, 
participation in an exchange rate regime and a need for a tax revenue. Lane (1997) shows that the link 
between openness and inflation only holds for the most highly developed countries when country size is 
held constant.  Cukierman et al. (1992) (CWN), and Cukierman (1994) summarise the empirical 
regularities in the correlation between CBI on the one hand and inflation and economic growth on the other, 
as follows: 
1.  Among industrial countries, the legal CBI index introduced in CWN is negatively correlated with 
inflation, but the turnover rate (TOR) of central governors has no correlation with inflation. 
2.  Among developing countries, the legal CBI index of CWN is not correlated with inflation, but the 
TOR is significantly related to inflation.  
 
A number of authors such as CWN and Grilli et al. (1991), (GMT) have undertaken different types of 
research for a number of countries, correlating CBI with various macroeconomic variables. Following a 
cross-section analysis, they found that more independence for the central bank is systematically associated 
with lower average inflation and less variable inflation. A step further in studying independence represents 
researches where new variables are introduced; the GDP growth rate and its variability. In first such 
research conducted on data for 18 developed countries, Grill et al. (1991) confirmed the influence of 
independence on inflation. On the contrary, there is no statistically relevant connection between 
independence and GDP growth rate, or its variability. The research done by Eijffiger et al. (1993) and 
Frattini and Huang (1994) resulted with similar findings. However, they also examined the influence of 
independence on inflation variability. The results of Eijffiger and Schaling on the example of 12 developed 
countries deny causal connection between independence and inflation variability. On the other hand, the 
results of research done by Frattini and Huang confirmed the influence of independence degree on the 
reduction of inflation variability.  
 
Loungani and Sheets (1995) have studied the relationship between CBI, inflation and economic growth in a 
cross-section analysis of 12 East European countries. Using the TOR of central bank governors and other 
two measures of legal independence, they concluded that independence is negatively correlated to inflation. 
They also concluded that high inflation, in the first years of transition, impairs economic growth. In other 
words, countries that manage to avoid high inflation seem to have a better chance for subsequent growth. 
Of course, lower initial inflation and higher GDP may be causally unrelated and driven by other factors. 
Meade and Crowea (2008) found robust evidence that CBI reduces inflation. This effect is robust to 
controls for endogeneity and measurement error via instrumental variables estimation. 
 
Eijffinger et al. (1994) and Cukierman and Webb (1995) additionally increase the number of dependent 
variables in relation to mentioned research. The research done by Eijffinger et al. (1994) on the example of 
10 developed countries, points to strong negative relation of independence and inflation for all used 
independence indexes except for GMT, while the influence of independence on inflation rate was not 
confirmed. In accordance with earlier researches, there is no statistically relevant connection between 
independence and GDP growth or independence and the variability of the growth. A step further in this 
research was done by studying relationship between independence and interest rate. Statistically relevant 
negative connection between independence and interest rate has been confirmed for all indexes used. 
 
The Cukierman and Webb research (1995) offered a new aspect of CBI. Apart from the well-known index 
of TOR of central bank governors, the authors based their CBI indicator on its sensitivity to political 
changes. The research on 64 economies confirmed the positive influence of both central bank’s political 
                                                                          
7 Cukierman (1992), Legal variables aggregate weighted FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       09-09 
  Page 8 of 14
sensitivity and TOR on inflation and its variability. Contrary to earlier researches, though statistically 
almost insignificant, the influence of TOR on GDP growth is positive. Statistical importance of the 
influence of political sensitivity on GDP growth was confirmed when border cases of countries which made 
a significant economic growth (Brazil, South Korea and Botswana), despite the fact that high values of both 
indexes (high TOR and high level of political sensitivity), were removed from the sample. These results are 
different of those obtained by Eijffinger et al. (1994), and also contrary to results obtained by most other 
authors. Furthermore, Cukierman and Webb (1995) studied the influence of independence on interest rate 
on deposits. The results confirm a significant influence of central bank’s political sensitivity and TOR on 
variability of the ex post real interest rate which confirms the thesis on higher variability of ex post real 
interest rate in countries with lower level of CBI. 
 
Alesina and Summers (1993) went furthest in analyzing the effects of independence on economic variables. 
Their research confirmed almost perfect negative correlation between inflation and independence and as a 
consequence a strong negative correlation between inflation variability and independence. Apart from this, 
the research confirmed the absence of any kind of independence influence on other macroeconomic 
variables: GNP, GNP per capita, unemployment and interest rate. These results support theoretical concept 
of neutrality of money (Alesina and Summers, 1993). 
 
Table 1: The empirical research on influence of CBI) 
AUTHOR INDICATOR  SAMPLE  PERIOD  DEPENDENT  VARIABLE 
Bade & Parkin (1988)  BP  12 A  1972 - 86  Inflation, inflation variability, 
Alesina (1988, 1989)  AL  16 A   1973 - 85  Inflation, inflation variability, 
Grilli et al. (1991)  GMT  18 A   1950 - 89  Inflation, budget deficit, output 
growth and variability of growth 
Cukierman et al. (1992)  LVAW, 
QVAW, TOR  
72 A   1950 - 89  Inflation, inflation variability, central 
bank credit to public sector 
De Haan & Sturm (1992)  AL, ES, GMT  14, 18 & 
11 A  
1961 - 87  Inflation, inflation variability, budget 
deficit, GDP growth rate, central 
bank credit to public sector 
De Long & Summers 
(1992) 
% AL and GMT  16 A   1955 - 90  GDP growth rate per working person 
Alesina & Summers 
(1993) 
% AL and GMT  16 A  1955 - 88  Inflation, inflation variability,, GNP 
growth, variability of growth  
unemployment, unemployment 
variability, interest rate, interest rate 
variability 
Cukierman et al. (1993)  LVAW, TOR  50 A & B  1960 - 89  Output, growth, private investment, 
productivity growth, interest rate 
De Haan et al. (1993)  GMT  18 A   1979 - 89  Disinflation costs 
Eijffinger & Schaling 
(1993) 
AL, BP, ES, 
GMT 
12 A   1972 - 91  Inflation, inflation variability,  output 
growth, variability of growth 
Havrilesky & Granato 
(1993) 
AL  18 A  1955 - 87  Inflation 
Pollard (1993)  % AL and GMT  16 A  1973 - 89  Budget deficit, variance of deficit, 
Posen (1993, 1995)  FOI, LVAU, 
LVAW 
17 1950-1989  Inflation 
De Haan & Eijffinger 
(1994) 




1972 – 91 
1977 – 81 
1982 - 91 
Inflation, inflation variability, output 
growth , variability of growth* 
De Haan & Siermann 
(1994) 
TOR  43 B  1950 - 89  Inflation 
Eijffinger et al. (1994)  AL, BP, EMP, 
ES, GMT 
21 A  1977 - 90  Inflation, inflation variability, output 
growth, variability of growth, interest 
rate, interest rate variability 
Fratianni & Huang (1994)  % 9 indicators  15 A  1960 - 90  Inflation, inflation variability, output 
growth, output variability FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       09-09 
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21 A  1973 - 89  Inflation 
Cargill (1995)  LVAW  20 A  1962 - 91  Inflation 




64 A & B  1950 - 89  Inflation, inflation variability, output 
growth, level and variance of interest 
rates,  
Debelle & Fischer (1995)  GMT and 
components 
18 A  1960 - 92  Inflation, Disinflation costs 
De Haan (1995)  Components of 
LVAW 
21 A  1973 - 89  Inflation, inflation variability 
Eijffinger & Van Kuelen 
(1995) 
AL, BP, ES, 
GMT 
11   1982 - 93  Inflation, inflation variability 
Gartner (1995)  GMT, LVAW, 
% AL i GMT 
9 (16) A  1966 - 88  Disinflation costs 
Walsh (1995)  GMT, LVAW  11 EZ  1973 – 
91/2 
Disinflation costs 
Loungani & Sheets (1995)  GMT, TOR  12 A  1993  Inflation 
Bleaney (1996)  LVAW  17 A  1973 - 89  Inflation, unemployment 
Fuhrer (1997)  LVAW  70  1950-1989  Inflation 
Campillo & Mirno (1997)  CUK, LVAW  62  1973-1994  Average inflation, political 
instability, the degree of openness, 
GDP per capita, participation in an 
exchange rate regime, the need for 
tax revenue 
Crosby (1998)  LVAU  44  1962 - 91  Output variability 
Temple (1998)  TOR  18  1974 - 94  Inflation 




30 B  1950- 94  Budget deficit, monetization of 
deficit 
Posen (1998)  LVAW  17 OECD  1950 - 89  Disinflation costs 




12  1980 - 89  Output growth, GDP deflator growth 
De Haan & Kooi (2000)  TOR - index  82  1980 - 89  Inflation, inflation variability, output 
growth 
De Haan & Sturm (2001)  TOR, TOR - 
index  
45, 76  1980 – 89 
1990 - 98 
Inflation 
Brumm (2006)  LVAW, TOR,  
Political 
vulnerability 
24 B  1973 - 94  Inflation 
Meade  & Crowea (2008)  CWN, CBLD  96  1987–91  Inflation, real GDP per capita, 
democracy, openness, exchange rate 
regime 
A – developing countries, B – developed countries 
Source: prepared by authors according to Eijffinger, Haan, (1996), pp. 64-66 
 
Researches on influence of independence on economy did not focus only on mentioned variables. Grilli et 
al. (1991) examined the influence of independence on budget deficit. Though the research confirmed 
connection between the variables to be negative, reliability of the relation was made questionable because 
of the fact it was not a statistically significant relation. Pollard (1993) as well as de Haan and Sturm (1992) 
obtained similar results. The later two investigated the influence of independence on both central bank’s 
credit activity and budget deficit. Only the GMT index had statistically relevant results, while this was not 
the case for other two indexes (AL, ES). These results are close to results of earlier researches where 
statistical relevance of relation between TOR and central bank’s credit activity was confirmed (see 
Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992)). 
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In the mean time, the number of researches in this field has decreased, while the focus of scientists 
remained the same. Research results, however, bring into question causal relations between CBI and other 
variables. De Haan and Kooi (2000) and De Haan and Sturm (2001) obtained the results that make the 
influence of independence on other variable questionable. In certain regressions, the CBI turned out to be 
statistically irrelevant variable. In both cases, statistical significance of modified TOR index was obtained 
only by expanding the sample to countries with high inflation rates. The paper by Ismihan and Ozkan 
(2004) goes a step further. They do not only deny the positive effects of independence, but also attribute to 
independence negative features in certain circumstances. In economies with high productivity of 
government investments, inclined to deficit monetization, a full CBI has a short-term positive effect. It 
reduces inflation, while its long-term effects on price stability are negative. The authors justify their theses 
with the fact that a low inflation rate stimulated with CBI decreases state investments, which causes 
decrease in economy productivity as well as weaker possibility of influencing inflation in the future 
(Ismihan, Ozkan, 2004). Related to previously described research, Brum (2006) considers the Izmihan and 
Ozkan findings to be results of a CBI’s calculation mistake. Using the analysis of variance structure with 
the same data, his results emphasize strong negative relation between CBI and inflation.  
 
 
4.  The independence of Croatian national bank 
 
In this section we examine the level of independence of the CNB. In the Act on the Croatian National Bank 
(article 2 (2), 2 (10)) CNB states to be independent while attaining its objectives and tasks. It also states 
that all of its members are independent while making and implementing their decisions and they do not 
depend nor do they ask any instructions from the state or its institutions. 
 
If we refer to functional independence we have to examine the degree of freedom in choosing the 
objectives of monetary policy. CNB's main goal is attaining and maintaining price stability. According to 
the article 3.2 CNB will support economic policy and act according to the principles of open market 
economy and free competition, as long as it does not endanger its main objective. Concerning its main 
objective, CNB has adjusted its legislature to the demands of Maastricht agreement. 
 
In examining the institutional freedom of CNB, we should concentrate on freedom to select the instruments 
of monetary policy, their definition and implementation. CNB claims to be independent while passing and 
implementing its decisions. It also states that it is not dependent on the instructions of the Croatian 
government, bodies that represent EU or third party. In accomplishing its objectives, but without 
endangering its main objective and tasks, CNB is allowed to cooperate with the government and other 
governmental bodies. Government delivers to the CNB all the proposals and reports in connection with the 
objectives, business and tasks of the CNB. In addition to this, government also delivers proposals of 
decisions, directives and acts, before they are passed on to the Parliament, to CNB to offer its opinion. At 
least once on a semi-annual basis, Ministry of finance consults with CNB concerning semi-annual plans of 
domestic and foreign indebtness (article 38). Moreover, Ministry of finance is obligated to inform CNB 
about all the transactions concerning domestic and foreign debt. CNB may suggest passing laws; related to 
its goals, tasks or generally related to its incidence, to the government expecting that the government will 
afterwards suggest it to the Parliament (article 39.1).  In the case of the CNB, the law does point out the 
independence of the functions and their implementation. 
 
Personal independence refers to the role and status of the central bank. It also refers to the appointment and 
election process, removal from office, the duration of a mandate and possibility of re-election. Council of 
CNB consists of governor, four vice-governors at the most, deputy governor and maximum 8 external 
members. The Governor of the CNB is appointed by the Croatian Parliament on the proposal of the 
Elections, Appointments and Administration Committee, taking into account the opinion of the Finance and 
Central Budget Committee. In Croatia, the duration of the governor’s mandate lasts for 6 years. The Deputy 
Governor and Vice governors are appointed by the Croatian Parliament on the proposal of the Governor of 
the CNB. The external members of the Council of the CNB are appointed by the Croatian Parliament on the 
proposal of the Elections, Appointments and Administration Committee, taking into account the opinion of FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       09-09 
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the Finance and Central Budget Committee. The members of the Council of the CNB must be citizens of 
the Republic of Croatia and they should have professional experience in monetary, financial, banking or 
legal matters. The members of the Council of the CNB are appointed for a period of six years. Law usually 
puts certain limitations for Council members to avoid possible conflicts of interests, so in Croatia they also 
exist. Restrictions that members should obey are; they can not perform as representatives in the Parliament 
nor take part in matters in which they would be employed by the Parliament or by the government. 
Moreover, a member of CNB can not be a member of the government. Also, they can not officiate tasks in 
the local governance and self-government nor in political parties or syndicate organizations. Members are 
not allowed to work as associates in banks, audit institutions and other legal institutions related to banks or 
controlled by CNB. Also, they may not own shares or holdings in other legal persons connected with the 
said persons by ownership, management or function, or shares or holdings in audit firms and persons 
connected there with. In addition, member's spouse and children are also not allowed to own shares or 
holdings in the institutions which are authorised by or supervised by the CNB (article 45). Regarding 
removal from office, it will occur in the case of a felony, serious violations and longer working inability 
owing to illness. Furthermore, it will occur if a member itself demands to be removed from office, if it fails 
to submit, or submits a false declarations concerning restrictions (article 46). 
 
Financial independence relates to budget independence and prohibition of monetary financing. Central 
banks should not allow themselves to get in a position of insufficient financial resources, necessary to fulfil 
its duties. There are certain issues that central banks must settle to be financially independent; who 
manages the budget, how to restore net loss, is it allowed to finance government and if it is, when is it 
allowed etc. It is important to stress out that CNB is independent from the Ministry of finance since 
relationship of this two could lead to high inflation. However, a certain contact between this two exists. 
CNB performs fiscal agency function, function of depository, function of participant in legislative 
procedures and function of a consultant of Ministry of finance. Nevertheless, CNB points out that the 
budget is managed by the bank, independently from any governmental institution. The Council of CNB 
adopts the financial plan while the capital remains is in the hands of the state. Concerning net loss, if it 
occurs, it is usually covered from the CNB's reserves. In the case of insufficient reserves the loss can be 
covered from the state budget or by issuing stocks.  In Croatia direct financing of government is firmly 
forbidden, nevertheless CNB is allowed to purchase government securities on secondary market, and 
thereby finance government indirectly. 
 
 
4.1 Measuring the CBI 
 
In order to examine the level of independence of CNB, we use three methods ; 1) TOR of central bank 
governors, 2) Petursson G. Thorarinn criterion of determining CBI and 3) Grilli, Masciandaro, Neyapti 
(GMT) questionnaire.  
 
 
4.1.1 TOR of central bank governors  
 
For the developing countries, like Croatia, the most appropriate indicator of CBI is the TOR of central bank 
governors which is defined as an average duration of the governor’s office.  It is calculated as a ratio of 




Cukierman defined an upper limit for this rate to 0, 2 - 0, 24 when the governor is elected every 4 to 5 
years. A lower rate indicates that the central bank is more isolated from the government pressures, at the 
same time suggesting greater independence of central bank in defining objectives of the monetary policy. 
Cukierman also stated that an extremely low TOR of central bank governors does not indicate a high level 
of independence, but it can prove that the governor is dependent on the government.  During the last 19 FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       09-09 
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years the CNB had four governors; Ante Čičin-Šain (1990-1992), Pero Jurković (1992.-1996.), Marko 
Škreb (1996-2000) and Željko Rohatinski (2000- ). The observed period is 19 years and the number of 
governors in the observed period is 4. This makes TOR index of 0, 21, a result within the desired interval.  
 
 
4.1.2 Petursson G. Thorarinn criterion of determining central bank's independence 
 
Petursson G. Thorarinn criterion of determining the level of CBI arises out from the analysis of 5 criteria. 
The relative weight of every criterion is based on its importance for achieving CBI. According to Petursson 
G. Thorarinn criterion, the CBI is measured on the scale from 0, 7 to 65. 
 
Table 2: CNB independence according to Petursson G. Thorarinn criterion 
Criterion Weight  Points  Total 
The extent to which statutory objectives provide the 
central bank with a clear focus on price stability  1 10  10 
The extent to which the central bank determines the 
setting of policy targets  1 10  10 
The extent to which the central bank determines the 
adjustment of monetary policy instruments  2 10  20 
The extent to which treasury funding through the central 
bank is prohibited  2 10  20 
The length of the governor’s term of office  0,5  7,1  3,55 
Total     63,55 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
The analysis showed that the level of CBI in Croatia is at the stance of 63, 55 which should be interpreted 
as a very high result. The reason for not achieving the maximum level of 65 points is the fact that the 
duration of the governor’s term of office has to be at least 8 years or longer to satisfy the criterion entirely. 
 
 
4.1.3 Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti questionnaire  
 
The CWN questionnaire is used as a measure of central bank legal independence. In order to maintain the 
full consistence of the methodology the questionnaire was fulfilled by CNB specialists. Measuring legal 
CBI relies on the analysis of 16 different legal variables, each coded from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest), 
showing the level of independence.  
 
Table 3: CNB independence according to Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti questionnaire 





Chief executive officer (CEO) 
Term of office 
Who appoints CEO 
Dismissal 







Policy formation                                     
Who formulates monetary policy 
Resolution of conflict                              










Limitations on lending to the 
government 
Advances (limitation on no securitized 
lending)                                                    
Securitized lending                                   0,10 1,00 FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       09-09 







Terms of lending                                     
Potential borrowers from the bank          
Determination of the limits on central 
bank lending                                            
Maturity of loans                                     
Interest rates on loans 
Is the central bank prohibited from 
buying or selling government 
securities in the primary market 
0,025 1,00 
Total 1,00  0,904 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
The analysis of CNB's independence according to the CWN numerical coding confirmed a rather high level 
of legal independence. On the scale from 0 to 1, the legal independence of our monetary authority was 
approximated at the level of 0,904. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
A trend of increasing importance of CBI is present in most of developed economies. The CBI is perceived 
as a conventional trend that almost all central banks follow. It appears to be a condition for conducting 
credible monetary policy. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is supposed to induce 
greater price stability and better overall economic situation, since an independent central bank is less likely 
to be exposed to the inflationary bias, inherent in monetary policy, and is more aware of the inflation costs 
of expansionary monetary policy. 
 
The presented empirical evidences concerning relation between CBI and economic performance suggests 
negative relationship between CBI and inflation. The strong evidence of CBI influence on other 
macroeconomic variables was not found.  
 
The analysis of the independence of CNB was made using three methods; 1) TOR of central bank 
governors, 2) Petursson G. Thorarinn criterion of determining central bank's independence and 3) 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti questionnaire. The obtained results affirm high level of CBI in conducting 
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